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Blowing the Whistle on Van Asdale:  
Analysis and Recommendations 
Christopher Wiener* 
This Note examines the state of whistleblower protection at the state and federal level. It 
focuses on the protection granted to whistleblowers of securities fraud under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Most courts considering the statute have required that the 
plaintiff have had both an objective and subjective belief that securities fraud had been 
committed. In 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided 
Van Asdale v. International Game Technology. The court broke with the other 
circuits in not requiring the plaintiff-employees to have a subjective belief that a 
violation had actually occurred and, instead, conferred whistleblower protection where 
the plaintiff-employees merely believed that an investigation into possible securities 
fraud was warranted. This Note explores the implications of the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard and argues that it should be overturned. Instead of lowering the requirements 
to achieve protected status, this Note argues that an expansion of whistleblowing 
remedies would better effectuate the goal of rooting out securities fraud. Congress 
should act to change the whistleblower protection scheme, as piecemeal judicial 
manipulation would only exacerbate the problem. The Note concludes with an 
examination of the whistleblower protections contained in the Dodd-Frank Act, 
arguing that the changes failed to correct the underlying structural problems with the 
federal whistleblower protection system. 
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Introduction 
As the dust begins to settle on what many called the Great 
Recession,1 and allegations of securities fraud begin to emerge,2 it is 
worth examining the reforms instituted in the United States after the 
previous recession. In 2002, with a slumping economy and the financial 
sector reeling from the scandals of Enron and WorldCom, the United 
States Congress enacted a sweeping securities reform legislation known 
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).3 The Act received 
bipartisan support,4 with President George W. Bush describing it as a 
“far-reaching reform”5 and Democrats describing themselves as 
“grateful” for the bill’s passage.6 While it is impossible to discern the 
exact reasoning underlying each side’s support, what is clear is that fraud 
prevention was at the forefront of Congress’s motivations.7 The scandals 
and collapses of Enron, Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, and their ilk 
pressed Congress into enacting SOX.8 Indeed, one commentator argues 
that the passage of SOX “reveal[ed] a deep skepticism” on the part of 
Congress, leading to “an unprecedented willingness to override state 
corporate law.”9 
To encourage insiders who might have information about fraud to 
come forward, the Act included a provision bestowing “special 
protection”10 on whistleblowers who report securities fraud at publicly 
traded companies (enacted as § 1514A of the Act).11 These protections 
were intended to encourage whistleblowers to step forward and 
 
 1. See Justin Lahart, The Great Recession: A Downturn Sized Up, Wall St. J., July 28, 2009, at 
A12; Robert J. Samuelson, The Great Recession’s Aftermath, Newsweek (Jan. 4, 2010), 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/229210.  
 2. Dan Fitzpatrick & Kara Scannell, Ex-BofA Chief Sued for Fraud, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 2010, at 
A1. 
 3. Jeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting the Jurisdictional Framework for Private Rights of Action Under 
the Federal Securities Laws, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 621, 639 (2006). 
 4. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. Times, July 31, 
2002, at A1. 
 5. Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primer and a 
Critique, 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 831, 831–32 (2007). 
 6. See Bumiller, supra note 4. 
 7. Cook, supra note 3, at 639. 
 8. Special Report—Sarbanes-Oxley: A Price Worth Paying?, Economist, May 21, 2005, at 
81, 81. 
 9. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Regulation 59 (11th ed. 2009). 
 10. Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection Under 
Sarbanes-Oxley: A Proposal for Change, 44 Am. Bus. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2007). 
 11. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006) (“No company with a class of securities 
registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . or that is required to file reports 
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee . . . because of any lawful 
act done by the employee . . . to provide information, . . . or otherwise assist in an investigation . . . .”). 
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companies to take seriously complaints by their employees.12 Congress 
hoped to achieve these objectives by providing clearer guidance to 
whistleblowers than the “vagaries” of the state law provisions, which 
employers regularly and deftly avoided.13  
Sherron Watkins, a vice president at Enron who reported 
irregularities at the company, testified before Congress and helped 
motivate action in the whistleblower arena.14 Ms. Watkins told a 
congressional subcommittee about the “highly intimidating” demeanor 
of Enron’s executives, particularly the Chief Financial Officer and Chief 
Executive Officer.15 Executives at Enron carefully cultivated an 
oppressive environment through “hostility and obfuscation,” seeking to 
prevent intra-company monitoring and reporting by employees.16 These 
efforts were apparently so successful that employees joked about the 
company’s irregular earnings reports, rather than raising their concerns 
or blowing the whistle.17 Perhaps most pertinent to the whistleblower 
protections in SOX, Ms. Watkins testified about her fear of termination 
if she directly reported the irregularities to executives at Enron18—a 
reasonably held fear, given that after her internal reporting on the 
company’s irregular finances, the company demoted her and confiscated 
her hard drive.19 Congress, it seems, hoped to deputize employees to 
ferret out fraud, because “[t]he corporate scandals of the Enron era 
demonstrated that employees had valuable information about ongoing 
financial and accounting fraud, and . . . very few incentives [under the 
existing regime] . . . to blow the whistle on their employers.”20 
In an attempt to remedy that incentive disparity, SOX’s 
whistleblower provision prohibits employers from retaliating against 
employees who engage in protected reporting activities related to “any 
conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation 
[of certain securities laws] . . . .”21 The Act does not provide any guidance 
on what constitutes reasonable belief.22 However, by 2009, the circuit 
 
 12. Watnick, supra note 5, at 841. 
 13. See id. at 842. 
 14. See Dan Ackman, Sherron Watkins Had Whistle, But Blew It, Forbes (Feb. 14, 2002), 
http://www.forbes.com/2002/02/14/0214watkins.html. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate 
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 1107, 1121–22 (2006). 
 17. Id. at 1120. 
 18. Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the 
Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 St. John’s L. Rev. 875, 877–78 
(2002). 
 19. See Jodie Morse & Amanda Bower, The Party Crasher, Time, Dec. 30, 2002, at 53, 53. 
 20. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley 
Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 91, 109 (2007). 
 21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 22. See id.  
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courts that had considered the protections of § 1514A agreed: The 
employee must have possessed both an objective and subjective belief 
that a violation of one of the enumerated securities laws had occurred.23 
In August 2009, after the other circuits coalesced around the 
objective-subjective standard, the Ninth Circuit decided a SOX 
whistleblower claim in Van Asdale v. International Game Technology.24 
Though the court agreed that a § 1514A claim required both objective 
and subjective belief, it broke with the other circuits in not requiring the 
plaintiff-employees to have a subjective belief that a violation had 
actually occurred and instead, conferred whistleblower protection where 
the plaintiff-employees merely believed that an investigation into 
possible securities fraud was warranted.25 This interpretation of the Act 
broadened the sphere of protected conduct, with the court holding that 
“[r]equiring an employee to essentially prove the existence of fraud 
before suggesting the need for an investigation would hardly be 
consistent with Congress’s goal of encouraging disclosure.”26 With Van 
Asdale, the Ninth Circuit precipitated a split among the circuits which, if 
left unresolved, threatens to undermine the uniform national framework 
Congress sought to create with respect to securities fraud whistleblowers. 
In July 2010, Congress passed the financial reform bill known as the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank Act”).27 This Act included several provisions related to various 
federal whistleblower protection schemes, including expanded 
protections under the False Claims Act (FCA),28 qui tam awards and 
retaliation protection for reporting violations to the SEC,29 retaliation 
protections for financial services whistleblowers reporting violations to 
the new Consumer Protection Bureau,30 and finally, reduction of 
procedural barriers to SOX whistleblowers.31 
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s expansion of the SOX 
whistleblowing scheme should be overturned. This Note further argues 
that a limited expansion of the remedies for SOX whistleblowers would 
best effectuate Congress’s stated intentions, in contrast to an expansion 
of the class of plaintiffs or a proliferation of disparate statutory 
 
 23. See Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2009); Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc., 520 F.3d 
344, 352 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Thus, § 1514A requires both a subjective belief and an objectively 
reasonable belief that the company’s conduct constitutes a violation of the relevant law.”); Allen v. 
Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 24. 577 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 25. Id. at 1000–02. 
 26. Id. at 1002. 
 27. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 28. Id. § 1079A(b)(2). 
 29. Id. § 922. 
 30. Id. § 1057. 
 31. Id. § 922. 
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protections for whistleblowers. Part I begins by analyzing the patchwork 
of state and federal whistleblower protections and their interaction with 
§ 1514A. Part II discusses the circuit split, beginning with the origins of 
the objective-subjective requirement and the arguments in favor of the 
“actual violation” model of belief adopted by the First, Fourth, and Fifth 
Circuits. Part II then discusses the facts of Van Asdale and analyzes the 
Ninth Circuit’s adoption of, and justifications for, the “investigation” 
model for SOX whistleblower protections. Part III discusses the 
incentives and disincentives facing whistleblowers and examines the 
interaction between Van Asdale and these incentives, focusing on the 
risk of false claims. Part IV argues that expanding so-called retrospective 
remedies to improve whistleblowing protections is more 
methodologically sound than the Ninth Circuit’s approach. It also 
contends that adopting a lower standard for a whistleblower status, a 
bounty-like reward system, or a piecemeal expansion of existing 
protections would increase neither the quality nor quantity of 
whistleblowing under SOX. Part IV further argues that the “actual 
violation” model adopted by the majority of circuits provides the best 
mix of judicial efficiency, manageable standards, and employee 
incentives. Part IV concludes by noting that congressional action in this 
arena, with the Dodd-Frank Act, has only exacerbated the problems 
associated with a fractured system by failing to utilize the frameworks 
described in this Note. 
I.  State Law, Federal Law, and the Role of § 1514A 
This Part discusses the history of whistleblower protections at the 
state and federal level. This Part further explains the role of SOX in a 
patchwork system, while also discussing the history, legislative reasoning, 
and passage of the Act generally and § 1514A specifically. 
A. The Patchwork Quilt of State Whistleblower Protections 
The protections and incentives for whistleblowers established by the 
Act are but a small portion of the state and federal whistleblowing 
scheme. Every state has at least some form of statutory whistleblower 
protection.32 Seventeen states have enacted comprehensive state 
whistleblower protections: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
 
 32. See State Whistleblower Statutes, Nat’l Whistleblowers Ctr., http://www.whistleblowers.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=742&Itemid=161 (last visited Dec. 17, 2010); see also 
Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 1029, 1087–120 (2004) (summarizing the 
state of whistleblower protection in all fifty states). 
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North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, and 
Vermont.33 
The multitude of regulatory schemes at the state level is, at best, 
uneven and confusing. Their patchwork nature results in a system of 
protections that is “murky, piecemeal, disorganized, and varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”34 Unfortunately, they “leave many 
whistleblowers inadequately protected against retaliation.”35 Moreover, 
the interaction of the numerous and incomplete federal schemes36 with 
state laws can result in a whistleblower “fall[ing] into the gap between 
the federal and state laws, where neither body of law offers satisfactory 
protection.”37 
B. Making Sense of the Patchwork of Federal Whistleblower 
Protections 
In contrast to most state laws, which broadly prohibit retaliatory 
action by a class of employers (including government agencies, large 
private companies, and the like), federal whistleblower protections are 
most often designed to facilitate the reporting of a specific type of 
information.38 In effect, Congress has enacted whistleblower protections 
on a somewhat ad hoc basis as it has considered various regulatory 
schemes. The notable exception to this issue-based scheme is the 
Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA).39 The WPA prohibits retaliation 
against civil service employees for “any disclosure of information . . . which 
the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences . . . a violation 
of any law, rule, or regulation.”40 Court interpretations of the WPA, 
coupled with statutory restrictions, serve to blunt this general guarantee 
of protection and, in fact, create a much less comprehensive system than 
appears at first glance. For example, an employee would not be protected 
if she reported illegal activities in the course of her job duties or gave a 
report to an immediate supervisor.41 The WPA can be understood as 
being at its strongest when dealing with civil service employees—subject 
 
 33. See State Whistleblower Statutes, supra note 32. 
 34. Cherry, supra note 32, at 1049. 
 35. Courtney J. Anderson DaCosta, Stitching Together the Patchwork: Burlington Northern’s 
Lessons for State Whistleblower Law, 96 Geo. L.J. 951, 957 (2008). 
 36. See infra Parts I.B–C. 
 37. Trystan Phifer O’Leary, Note, Silencing the Whistleblower: The Gap Between Federal and 
State Retaliatory Discharge Laws, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 663, 676 (2000). 
 38. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 3608 (2006) (asbestos in schools); 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2006) (violations of 
the Atomic Energy Act); 49 U.S.C. § 20109 (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (railroads). For a broad overview 
of the federal whistleblower schema, see William Dorsey, An Overview of Whistleblower Protection 
Claims at the United States Department of Labor, 26 J. Nat’l Ass’n of Admin. L. Judges 43 (2006). 
 39. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2006). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 
97 Calif. L. Rev. 433, 448–49 (2009). 
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to the aforementioned limitations—but at its weakest for the private 
employee attempting to navigate the byzantine maze of possible 
statutory protections. 
Additional protection at the federal level can be found in the FCA.42 
The FCA incentivizes so-called “private attorneys-general” to bring 
actions against contractors who may be defrauding the federal 
government, primarily by means of qui tam damages awardable in the 
amount of fifteen to twenty-five percent of the government’s recovery.43 
“By providing individuals a guaranteed percentage of the recovery, the 
statute was designed as an incentive to encourage qui tam lawsuits.”44 
This Note will discuss, in Parts III and IV, that such bounty-like 
incentives would likely be inappropriate in the SOX whistleblower 
scheme.45 In short, the current federal scheme is confusing, convoluted, 
and “results in a haphazard enforcement structure.”46 
C. SOX, § 1514A and the Post-Enron Need for Securities Fraud 
Whistleblower Protections 
Entering this field of haphazard whistleblower protections, SOX 
enacted a whistleblower protection with uniformity and clarity (at least 
in the securities field) by creating a preemptive federal scheme that 
“provides greater consistency and protection for whistleblowers than 
state laws . . . . [and] promotes a more hospitable environment for 
whistleblowers in the corporate and securities context through a 
decreased threat of employer retaliation.”47 By providing a clear 
statutory protection for securities fraud whistleblowers, Congress hoped 
to remedy the situation whereby an employee in one state may have 
more or less protection than an employee in another state, despite 
reporting the same fraud committed by the same company.48 While the 
Act does not cover every conceivable variety of securities fraud, it has 
definitively added to the incentives for employees who may be tempted 
to blow the whistle. Moreover, the protections for whistleblowers have 
been read rather broadly by some courts; while this potentially adds 
confusion to the matrix of allowable and disallowable employer actions, 
it appears courts have, at least in some cases, read the statute broadly.49 
 
 42. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006). 
 43. Id. § 3730(d). 
 44. Sean Hamer, Lincoln’s Law: Constitutional and Policy Issues Posed by the Qui Tam Provisions 
of the False Claims Act, 6 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 89, 90 (1997). 
 45. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 46. Cherry, supra note 32, at 1051. 
 47. Marc I. Steinberg & Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability Exposure When the 
Whistle Blows in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 30 J. Corp. L. 445, 446 (2005). 
 48. 148 Cong. Rec. S7391, S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002). 
 49. One of these cases, the topic of this Note, broadened the definition of “protected activity.” 
Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir. 2009). In the other, a judge in the Eastern 
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Section 1514A achieves this goal of increased securities fraud 
reporting by prohibiting employers from taking any adverse employment 
action50 against an employee who “reasonably believes” that the 
company has committed fraud.51 The whistleblowing must have been a 
“contributing factor” in the adverse action, “mean[ing] any factor which, 
alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the 
outcome of the decision.”52 Employees who believe they were wronged 
can seek redress by filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor,53 who 
has delegated the authority to decide SOX whistleblower claims and 
issue related regulations to the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA).54 
While SOX certainly provides more clarity in the field, many 
commentators are nevertheless critical of what they see as shortcomings 
and limitations in the Act’s whistleblower protections.55 Perhaps most 
compelling is the criticism that SOX does not go far enough and instead, 
perpetuates confusion with the federal schema—it resolves ambiguities 
in one field and for certain employers, but fails to solve the problem of 
disparate and patchwork whistleblower laws.56 
II.  What Constitutes Fraud: Diverging Judicial Standards 
This Part analyzes the threshold test for securities fraud that 
employees must meet in order to fall within the Act’s whistleblower 
protections. A consensus seemed to be forming around the requirement 
for reasonable belief, entailing an objective and subjective standard of 
 
District of New York held that a corporate employee who had indirectly aided in blowing the whistle 
by “opening a channel of communication with the company’s CEO” and thereby, giving his colleague 
an opportunity to complain about suspect practices was similarly protected under SOX, despite the 
fact that he had “no knowledge of the company’s accounting practices” apart from what he had been 
told by the colleague. Mahoney v. Keyspan Corp., No. 04-CV-554SJ, 2007 WL 805813, at *1, *5 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007). 
 50. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006) (“[No publicly traded company] may 
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee 
in the terms and conditions of employment . . . .”). 
 51. Id. § 1514A(a)(1). 
 52. Watnick, supra note 5, at 850 (quoting Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 
1993)). 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A). 
 54. See Watnick, supra note 5, at 837–38. 
 55. See Cherry, supra note 32, at 1070 (arguing that the Act lacked procedures for responding to 
reports, and that whistleblower claims might be sent to arbitration instead of to the courts); Richard 
Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 975, 987 (2008) (“[D]espite the 
best intentions of these anti-retaliation protections, taken collectively their narrow and nuanced 
approach undermines their commendable goals.”). 
 56. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of Reform 
Versus Power, 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 183, 227–28 (2007). The author posits that Congress did not go 
further in consolidating whistleblower laws when passing SOX because of pressure from senior 
managers and the business community at-large. Id. at 230. 
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belief.57 However, in 2009, the Ninth Circuit significantly altered the 
subjective prong of the standard thereby relaxing the threshold for when 
the Act’s protections might apply.58 
A. Underlying Standards for Protection in SOX 
Section 1514A protects an employee when the employee discloses 
information to a regulatory or law enforcement agency, a member of 
Congress, or a supervisor within her company, so long as she “reasonably 
believes [the conduct] constitutes a violation” of the enumerated 
securities laws.59 The Department of Labor (DOL) has adopted regulations 
incorporating the same language to describe a protected activity.60 While 
this Note focuses on the requirements for reasonable belief, it should be 
noted that the statute also requires that the alleged violation of the 
securities laws at least approximate a claim for securities fraud.61 
B. The Emerging Standard of Objective and Subjective Belief 
Within about one year of each other, four circuit courts settled on 
the same standard for analyzing whistleblower claims under SOX. Each 
court accepted the underlying rationale from the statute and the DOL 
regulations: Whistleblowing requires a subjective and objective belief 
that a violation of the enumerated securities laws has occurred. 
1. Fifth Circuit: Allen v. Administrative Review Board 
In January 2008, fully seven years after SOX became law, the Fifth 
Circuit was the first appellate body to rule on a SOX whistleblower case 
in Allen v. Administrative Review Board.62 In Allen, the reporting 
employees were in charge of quality assurance, and one was a Director of 
Administration for one of the company’s divisions.63 An internal system 
was systematically overcharging customers.64 The reporting employees 
felt that the company was taking too long to issue refunds and that, due 
to this delay, the company was exposed to litigation from aggrieved 
customers that would potentially affect shareholder equity.65 
Furthermore, the reporting employees believed that certain SEC-
mandated accounting rules were not being followed, resulting in 
 
 57. See infra Part II.B. 
 58. See infra Part II.C. 
 59. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). 
 60. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.102 (2009). 
 61. Day v. Staples, Inc. 555 F.3d 42, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 62. 514 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 63. Id. at 471. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 472. 
Wiener_62-HLJ-531.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:21 PM 
December 2010]            BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON VAN ASDALE 541 
overstated profits in reports disclosed to shareholders.66 All three 
employees were eventually fired and later brought suit.67 
In finding that the reporting employees did not engage in protected 
activities, the court held that “an employee’s reasonable belief must be 
scrutinized under both a subjective and objective standard.”68 For 
objective belief, the court noted that “[t]he objective reasonableness of a 
belief is evaluated based on the knowledge available to a reasonable 
person in the same factual circumstances with the same training and 
experience as the aggrieved employee.”69 Unfortunately, the court failed 
to expand on this objective-subjective requirement any further and said 
little about the subjective aspect of the standard.70 
2. Fourth Circuit: Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc. 
Just a few months later, in March 2008, the Fourth Circuit decided 
Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc.71 Here, the employee reported that Wyeth’s 
drug manufacturing facilities did not comply with FDA regulations.72 The 
employee was eventually fired for what the company claimed was 
continued insubordination.73 He eventually brought suit, challenging the 
company’s claims and arguing that he was dismissed for whistleblowing. 
The court discussed the standard at length: 
  To “reasonably believe” that company conduct “constitutes a 
violation” of law, as those terms are used in § 1514A(a)(1), [the 
employee] must show not only that he believed that the conduct 
constituted a violation [subjective belief], but also that a reasonable 
person in his position would have believed that the conduct constituted 
a violation [objective belief] . . . . 
  Moreover, [§ 1514A] requires [the employee] to have held a 
reasonable belief about an existing violation . . . [put another way,] 
“the employee must have an objectively reasonable belief that a 
violation is actually occurring based on circumstances that the 
employee observes and reasonably believes.” We rejected the claim, 
however, that a reasonable belief that a violation has occurred or is in 
progress can include a belief that a violation is about to happen upon 
some future contingency.74 
In comparison to Allen, the Fourth Circuit significantly elaborated on the 
basic objective-subjective requirements.75 Notably, the court emphasized 
 
 66. Id. at 473. 
 67. Id. at 474–75. 
 68. Id. at 477. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. 520 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 72. Id. at 347–48. 
 73. Id. at 346. 
 74. Id. at 352 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 
332, 341 (4th Cir. 2006)). 
 75. See id. 
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the need for subjective belief in a past or continuing violation and 
suggested that more attenuated beliefs are insufficient to meet the 
threshold for statutory protection.76 It appears from the proximity in time 
between the respective decisions that the Fourth Circuit arrived at this 
objective-subjective standard independently of the Fifth Circuit. In a 
later decision, the Fourth Circuit explicitly noted the conformity of its 
reasoning in Livingston with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Allen.77 
3. First Circuit: Day v. Staples, Inc. 
The next year, in February 2009, the First Circuit would arrive at a 
similar conclusion in Day v. Staples, Inc.78 The reporting employee in this 
case raised concerns about the internal practices of a Staples product 
return center, practices that he believed resulted in potential over- and 
underissuance of refunds to customers (and thus, impacted shareholder 
value).79 After reporting his beliefs to numerous supervisors (and indeed, 
executives), the reporting employee was terminated and subsequently 
filed suit.80 
Here, the court agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s standard of 
objective-subjective belief.81 For objective belief, the court required that 
the reporting employee’s theory must “at least approximate the basic 
elements of a claim of securities fraud.”82 While an employee need not 
show an actual violation of the laws, she must believe that the conduct 
constitutes a violation of the enumerated provisions in § 1514A, with the 
proviso that “‘general inquiries’ . . . do not constitute protected 
activity.”83 
On subjective belief, the court framed the standard in terms of 
“subjective good faith” and took notice of the district court’s “concern 
about the plaintiff’s particular educational background and 
sophistication,” which might affect his reasonable belief.84 Although a 
somewhat different approach than that taken by the other circuits, which 
did not, at least explicitly, consider subjective good faith but instead, 
considered only subjective belief, the Fifth Circuit’s two-prong analysis is 
highly consistent with prior judicial decisions on SOX whistleblower 
standards. 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 277 n.4 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 78. 555 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 79. Id. at 46. 
 80. Id. at 46–49. 
 81. Id. at 55 (citing Welch, 536 F.3d at 275). 
 82. Id. at 55–56. The court noted that a claim of securities fraud resembles the tort of deceit and 
misrepresentation, and requires “a material misrepresentation or omission, scienter, loss, and a causal 
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the loss.” Id. at 56. 
 83. Id. at 55 (quoting Fraser v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, 417 F. Supp. 2d 310, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
 84. Id. at 54 n.10. 
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4. Seventh Circuit: Harp v. Charter Communications, Inc. 
Finally, in March 2009, the Seventh Circuit adopted the objective-
subjective standard—and cited the other circuits with approval— in Harp 
v. Charter Communications, Inc.85 The reporting employee was let go 
during a “reduction-in-force” and filed suit, alleging that she was 
terminated as the result of internal whistleblowing.86 The employee in 
this case believed that Charter was authorizing payments to a contractor 
for work that was never performed, and that the company had taken 
certain restructuring actions to interfere with the employee’s attempts to 
prevent such abuses.87 
In ruling against the reporting employee, the court had little 
occasion to go into the subjective element of the standard. While the 
court noted that the employee “must actually have possessed [the] belief 
[that fraud occurred], and that belief must be objectively reasonable,”88 it 
found that the employee simply could not as a matter of law have 
objectively believed a fraud had been committed—nor, for that matter, 
could she show that her termination was proximately caused by this 
whistleblowing.89 In short, the court adopted the objective-subjective 
standard in full, but simply did not analyze the subjective element. 
C. The Ninth Circuit and VAN ASDALE V. INTERNATIONAL GAME 
TECHNOLOGY 
While the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits adopted the 
objective-subjective standard with remarkably little deviation, in August 
2009, the Ninth Circuit broke with its sister circuits in Van Asdale v. 
International Game Technology.90 Even though it was discussed only in 
dicta, the court dramatically lowered the standard required under the 
objective-subjective standard. 
1. Factual and Procedural Background 
The plaintiffs in this case, Shawn and Lena Van Asdale, worked as 
corporate counsel for the defendant, International Game Technology 
(“IGT”).91 In late 2001, IGT began negotiations with Anchor Gaming 
regarding a possible merger.92 The merger created the nexus to SOX, 
because the Van Asdales’ claim related to reporting potential 
shareholder fraud in the course of the merger.93 One of Anchor’s most 
 
 85. 558 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 86. Id. at 722–23. 
 87. Id. at 723–25. 
 88. Id. at 723. 
 89. Id. at 726–27. 
 90. 577 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 91. Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1324 (D. Nev. 2007), rev’d, 577 F.3d 989. 
 92. Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 992. 
 93. Id. 
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valuable assets was a patent for a type of slot machine “wheel,” which a 
potential competitor was likely violating.94 After the merger went 
through, Shawn Van Asdale discovered that a flyer had been sent by the 
potential competitor to Anchor’s outside patent counsel prior to the 
merger, a flyer that apparently invalidated Anchor’s patent.95 As the 
court noted, “if Anchor’s wheel patent was invalid, the benefits of the 
merger may have been overvalued.”96 Shawn Van Asdale expressed 
concern that the flyer had not been included in the due diligence files 
Anchor provided to IGT before the merger and believed that 
investigation was warranted.97 IGT’s general counsel agreed and 
“promised to look into it.”98 Both Van Asdales were later terminated and 
filed suit, claiming that they had been fired for their internal 
whistleblowing activities, in violation of § 1514A.99 
The district court granted IGT’s motion for summary judgment.100 
The court’s reasoning with respect to the plaintiffs’ SOX claims centered 
on whether the Van Asdales believed that fraud had occurred or merely 
believed that fraud might have occurred and that this possibility should 
be investigated: 
Plaintiff Shawn Van Asdale was questioned extensively in his 
deposition regarding what comments he made to [IGT’s general 
counsel] at the November meeting, including “What did you say about 
the potential for fraud?”; “What did you tell him?”; “What other 
statement do you individually recall saying to Mr. Johnson at this 
meeting?”; and “Anything else you recall specifically saying to Mr. 
Johnson in this November 23rd meeting?” In all cases, Plaintiff Shawn 
Van Asdale’s answers never mentioned shareholder fraud in response 
to these questions. Instead, he gives context to the statements by saying 
that he told Mr. Johnson that they needed to “investigate these issues, 
the potential for fraud, before we could assert those patents because of 
inequitable conduct or fraud on the patent office . . . .”101 
The district court adopted the objective-subjective standard and held 
that to meet the subjective requirement, “the employee must actually 
believe that the employer was in violation of the relevant law or 
regulations and under the objective portion of the reasonableness 
requirement the employee’s belief must be objectively reasonable.”102 
For Lena Van Asdale, the court ruled as a matter of law that she did not 
have a subjective belief that fraud had occurred, because she had not 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 992–93. 
 96. Id. at 993. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 993–94. 
 100. Van Asdale, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 1334–35. 
 101. Id. at 1330–31 (alteration in original) (first emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 102. Id. at 1333. 
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made up her mind one way or another on this issue (and only felt that 
the company should investigate).103 The defendant did not contest that 
Shawn Van Asdale had a subjective belief, and the court found that he 
also met the objective belief standard; nevertheless, the court held that 
Shawn Van Asdale failed to show that he was terminated because of his 
reporting and thus, failed to meet the retaliation requirement.104 
2. The Ninth Circuit Modifies the Standard 
The Van Asdales appealed the grant of summary judgment to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.105 The court 
adopted the objective-subjective standard and cited the other circuits 
that had considered § 1514A.106 The court began by analyzing the 
objective element and agreed with the First Circuit’s holding that the 
employee’s theory of fraud must approximate a case of securities fraud.107 
If true, the court reasoned, Anchor’s failure to disclose the wheel patent 
to further its financial interests would approximate securities fraud. The 
court held that the Van Asdales were therefore objectively reasonable in 
their belief.108 
The Ninth Circuit proceeded to depart from the interpretations of 
other circuit courts when it analyzed the subjective element. The court 
began by examining the Act’s legislative history, specifically noting that 
the whistleblower protections were designed to “include all good faith 
and reasonable reporting of fraud, and [that] there should be no 
presumption that reporting is otherwise, absent specific evidence.”109 The 
court next examined the following portion of Lena Van Asdale’s 
testimony: 
  Q Prior to retaining [legal counsel], did you have any personal belief 
that a fraud had been perpetrated on the shareholders of IGT? 
  A I had a belief that something had happened in the due diligence 
with Anchor and IGT and that an investigation needed to be 
conducted to see if a fraud had occurred. 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1333–34. 
 105. Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2009) (“This case presents our 
first opportunity to examine the substantive requirements necessary to establish a claim under the 
whistleblower-protection provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.”). 
 106. Id. at 1000 (“The plain language of this section, as well as the statute’s legislative history and 
case law interpreting it, suggest that to trigger the protections of the Act, an employee must also have 
(1) a subjective belief that the conduct being reported violated a listed law, and (2) this belief must be 
objectively reasonable.” (citing Harp v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., 558 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2009); Day 
v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 54 (1st Cir. 2009); Welch v. Chao, F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 2008); Allen v. 
Amin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 2008))). 
 107. Id. at 1001; see supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 108. Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 1001. 
 109. Id. at 1002 (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. S7418-01, S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy)). 
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  Q So you didn’t have a specific belief that a fraud had occurred or 
not? 
  A I had a belief that an investigation needed to occur. 
  Q So you hadn’t reached a conclusion one way or another as to 
fraud? 
  A No, because we were not allowed to do an investigation. 
  Q Okay. But you had a strong belief that an investigation needed to 
be done? 
  A Yes.110 
Believing that Congress’s intention in passing SOX was to alleviate 
corporate culture dissuasive of whistleblowing, the court seemed inclined 
to give the Van Asdales the benefit of the doubt. Ostensibly keeping 
with congressional intent, the court found that “[r]equiring an employee 
to essentially prove the existence of fraud before suggesting the need for 
an investigation would hardly be consistent with Congress’s goal of 
encouraging disclosure.”111 Saying no more on the standard for 
reasonable belief, the court reversed and remanded.112 While not 
explicitly overturning any of the other circuits, the court in Van Asdale 
significantly broadened the protections of SOX. Whereas prior courts 
had found that an employee must believe that an actual violation had 
occurred (or was contemporaneously occurring), the Ninth Circuit 
required no such definitiveness; indeed, the court seemed to find such a 
requirement strongly contrary to congressional intent.113 
D. Contrasting the Approaches Taken by the Circuits 
As noted in Part II.C, the Ninth Circuit expanded the coverage of 
SOX; yet it did so without explicitly noting the split. Subsequently, two 
other courts have cited Van Asdale. In Harkness v. C-Bass Diamond, 
LLC, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland had 
occasion to rule on a case similar to Van Asdale.114 There, the district 
court distinguished on the facts and made no determination regarding 
the validity of the Van Asdale approach.115 Most recently, the Eleventh 
Circuit held, in an unpublished decision, that SOX protections required 
an actual subjective belief that is also objectively reasonable, essentially 
adopting the pre-Van Asdale standard.116 While the court cited Van 
Asdale, it did not address the decision’s underlying distinction and noted 
 
 110. Id. at 1002 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1004–05. 
 113. Id. at 1002. 
 114. No. 08-231, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24380, at *18–20 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2010). 
 115. Id. at *20. 
 116. See Gale v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 08-14232, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13104, at *7–10 (11th 
Cir. June 25, 2010). 
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only that the Ninth Circuit required both subjective and objective 
belief.117 
Either explicitly or implicitly, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuits all deemed it necessary to show that the reporting 
employee actually believed a violation occurred.118 The Ninth Circuit’s 
approach, at first blush, appears to be at odds with the statutory and 
regulatory underpinnings of the whistleblower protections, both of which 
utilize the same language protecting an employee who reports action 
they “reasonably believe[] constitutes a violation.”119 It is clear that “like 
virtually every whistleblower statute, domestic or foreign, whistleblowers 
[under SOX] are not required to be correct in order to be protected. 
They must merely reasonably believe that the information concerns a 
covered violation.”120 The standard espoused by the Ninth Circuit can be 
distinguished from the protection of sincere but inaccurate belief, insofar 
as the reporting employee under the Van Asdale standard can claim 
whistleblower status for merely saying that something “smells fishy” and 
should be investigated. This would potentially benefit the employee, as 
she will be covered earlier in the fraud-seeking process. It also seems to 
be in accord with the Van Asdale court’s view of congressional intent. 
However, when examined in the context of the prior circuit decisions, it 
becomes evident that this new standard will quickly become judicially 
unmanageable and expand the somewhat limited scope of protection 
enacted by Congress.121 This unmanageability, along with the deleterious 
effect that such a relaxed standard will have on employees and 
employers, is the topic of Part III. 
III.  The Impact of an “Investigation Standard” on 
SOX Whistleblowers and the Companies That Employ Them 
This Part examines the interplay between the Van Asdale standard 
for subjective belief on the one hand, and Congress’s goal of 
incentivizing whistleblowing in the securities arena on the other. Starting 
from a framework for determining how whistleblowers are incentivized 
(and by extension, how they should and could be incentivized), this Part 
analyzes the impact of the broadened standard within the existing SOX 
whistleblowing schema. This Part further examines the preexisting 
tension between corporations, who must deal with potential 
 
 117. Id. at *7–8. 
 118. See supra Part II.C. 
 119. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.102(b)(1) (2009). 
 120. Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1757, 1760 (2007). 
 121. For example, it seems clear that the plaintiff in Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc. would likely have 
prevailed on his claim, despite the fact that the company thoroughly investigated the matter and found 
that there simply were no violations (or potential violations) of securities law. See 520 F.3d 344, 352–54 
(4th Cir. 2008). 
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whistleblower claims and thus, seek some predictability and balance, and 
the whistleblowing intentions of Congress evidenced in SOX, and more 
abstractly, the intentions of Congress in protecting any whistleblower. 
A. Encouraging Whistleblowers: Frameworks for Incentivizing 
Disclosure 
SOX provides statutory remedies for employees who successfully 
report in order to “make the employee whole.”122 Specifically listed are 
compensatory damages including reinstatement, back pay with interest, 
and “special damages . . . including litigation costs, expert witness fees, 
and reasonable attorney fees.”123 What is notably missing from this rubric 
is any sort of affirmative incentive for employees to blow the whistle and 
compensation for indirect damages the employee might suffer. 
1. Obstacles to Whistleblowing 
There are numerous ways that a whistleblower law could incentivize 
disclosure; however, these must overcome the innate harm and damage 
that can be caused by whistleblowing. In his discussion of incentives 
under SOX, Professor Christopher Rapp notes the potential harms that a 
whistleblower faces: Their current employer might implode like Enron; 
the employee might be blacklisted from future employers who fear 
disloyalty; coworkers might shy away; the employee might face “social 
ostracism”; and they might suffer psychological damage from spending 
time in the limelight, at the center of the scandal.124 Professor Orly Lobel 
notes similar obstacles facing the potential whistleblower: fear and guilt, 
retaliation against family members, and threats on the employee’s life.125 
Indeed, he argues that “[w]histleblowing can thus become a form of 
professional suicide, effectively ending careers.”126 The harms may be 
even further removed from the employee’s professional life, as one 
commentator relates how “[o]ne whistleblower even saw his employer 
interfere in private litigation concerning custody over his children.”127 
Thus, it is clear that there are a host of non-pecuniary harms caused by 
whistleblowing that may, individually or in combination, serve to 
dissuade an employee from reporting fraud at her company. 
2. Ameliorating Harm: Retrospective and Prospective Remedies 
Roughly speaking, there are two schools of thought on what 
incentives exist (or should exist) for whistleblowers. The first camp seeks 
 
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1). 
 123. Id. § 1514A(c)(2). 
 124. Rapp, supra note 20, at 95–96. 
 125. Lobel, supra note 41, at 486–87. 
 126. Id. at 487. 
 127. Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 905, 
951 (2002). 
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retrospective non-compensatory damages. Essentially, they argue that 
whistleblowers face non-pecuniary and secondary economic damages, 
such as those discussed above.128 They seek to incentivize whistleblowers 
by ameliorating these additional harms in order to put the employee 
back in the same position she was in prior to reporting.129 This is, at its 
simplest, the method that SOX uses to incentivize whistleblowers, 
though within a limited constellation of remediable harms. The second 
group believes whistleblowers need prospective, bounty-like incentives in 
order to blow the whistle.130 Instead of placing the employee back in the 
position she was in before the whistleblowing, this group would place her 
in a better situation, drawing direct comparison to the FCA, which 
provides for a percentage of damages recovered by the government in 
contract fraud cases.131 
SOX approaches the incentive problem by providing retrospective 
“make whole” remedies to a whistleblowing employee.132 While this 
certainly qualifies as some form of incentive, the damages available 
would best be described as minimal.133 At first glance, it seems that non-
pecuniary damages are not included in the plain language of § 1514A. 
However, it is likely that courts would interpret the “special damages” 
clause to include at least some non-pecuniary damages, thus expanding 
the scope of remedies available to a SOX whistleblower.134 
On the other hand, prospective, bounty-like remedies can be 
thought of as providing an employee active incentives to disclose 
wrongdoing by giving the employee a cut of any future recovery. 
Providing this type of remedy seems like a win-win: The employee is 
compensated for her trouble and does not have to worry about 
secondary effects, and the government gets the information it desires. 
Indeed, there appears to be a movement toward the view of 
whistleblowers as saints, exposing corruption, acting courageously, and 
receiving their just compensation from society.135 Professor William 
Kovacic has identified three benefits to a bounty system for 
whistleblowers: (1) bounties encourage employees proximate to 
 
 128. See, e.g., Rapp, supra note 20, at 96. 
 129. Id. at 114. 
 130. See generally id. at 134–37 (discussing the merits of providing qui tam bounties for 
whistleblowers). 
 131. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3731 
(2006). 
 132. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1) (2006). 
 133. Pamela H. Bucy, “Carrots and Sticks”: Post-Enron Regulation Initiatives, 8 Buff. Crim. L. 
Rev. 277, 286 (2004). 
 134. See Nina Schichor, Does Sarbanes-Oxley Force Whistleblowers to Sacrifice Their Reputations?: 
An Argument for Granting Whistleblowers Non-Pecuniary Damages, 8 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 272, 282 
(2008). 
 135. See Lobel, supra note 41, at 488. 
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information about fraud to come forward instead of relying on audits, 
(2) incentivized whistleblowers can act faster and in areas where 
governmental momentum or political considerations may preclude 
investigation, and (3) bounties augment the limited funding available to 
government enforcement agencies, because the defrauder is indirectly 
paying the investigator’s salary.136 Professor Rapp proposes to adopt a 
bounty system within the SOX whistleblowing framework, modeling it 
on the FCA: 
If increasing the volume of whistleblowing, rather than simply 
protecting whistleblowers from retaliation, was Congress’ goal in 
passing SOX, financial incentives would better serve that aspiration. 
Moreover, financial incentives are structured to increase with the 
seriousness of the underlying fraud. Since the social value of disclosure 
of more serious frauds is particularly high, that linkage makes financial 
bounties a better tool than anti-retaliation provisions for maximizing 
effective whistleblowing.137 
While this “carrot” encouraging whistleblowers to come forward 
makes intuitive sense, bounties are not without their problems or 
detractors. Bounty programs have been described by some legislators as 
“Reward[s] for Rats,” which rely on greed and a desire for revenge on 
the part of whistleblowers.138 Frivolous or outright, false accusations by 
employees seeking to claim a whistleblower bounty could increase 
regulatory burdens and waste judicial resources. Professor Rapp argues 
that the amount of fraud potentially uncovered by bounty-seeking 
whistleblowers more than makes up for these “minimal” wasted 
resources.139 This analysis though seems to miss the collateral damage 
caused by false whistleblowing claims: the reputational harms suffered by 
managers and corporations, and the reverberating effect such (false) 
disclosure might have on the markets before it is deemed frivolous. 
Disgruntled employees seeking reinstatement and back pay, revenge-
seeking terminated employees, and the purely greedy would all be 
incentivized, along with the upstanding, fraud-reporting employee who 
such a system seeks to reward.140 
 
 136. William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government 
Contracting, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1799, 1821–25 (1996). 
 137. Rapp, supra note 20, at 135; see also Dworkin, supra note 120, at 1774 (agreeing that an FCA-
like incentive, as proposed by Rapp, could encourage whistleblowing). 
 138. Lobel, supra note 41, at 488. 
 139. Rapp, supra note 20, at 133. 
 140. Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of 
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1899, 1937–38 (2007) (“One significant cost of 
installing whistleblower protections of the kind described in Sarbanes-Oxley is the cost of evaluating a 
whistleblower complaint. Particularly where bounties are involved, as noted above, there are likely to 
be several false complaints for every valid one. The risk of receiving false complaints is compounded 
when one takes into account the fact that disgruntled former employees, especially those who have 
been terminated, are likely to bring whistleblower complaints in order to try to obtain reinstatement 
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Clearly whistleblowers need some form of incentive, either to 
compensate for harms suffered by whistleblowing (pecuniary and non-
pecuniary, direct and indirect) or to encourage whistleblowing by 
providing lucrative bounties sufficient to overcome the aforementioned 
harms and obstacles. While there are compelling reasons to believe that 
bounties would provide a socially desirable increase in fraud reporting, 
there are also significant questions as to the efficacy and “noise” that 
would surely follow. 
B. VAN ASDALE and the Incentive Framework 
While not explicitly mentioning it, one can find an underlying goal 
of increasing whistleblower protections and reporting in the Ninth 
Circuit’s Van Asdale decision. The court specifically noted its 
dissatisfaction with an employee having to prove the existence of fraud 
before reporting it, an inconsistency the court felt was contrary to 
congressional intent.141 Practically speaking, there are two paths that can 
be taken to encourage whistleblowing. The first involves incentives and 
remedies, making it a “fair deal” to report fraud. The second is more 
procedural in nature, expanding the class of plaintiffs and the types of 
behavior that will qualify for protection. 
Obviously a court is limited in its ability to modify the former, as it 
is confined to the statutorily provided remedies. However, by expanding 
the class of plaintiffs and breaking with the other circuits, the Ninth 
Circuit has read too much into § 1514A. By expanding protections to 
employees who have only inchoate beliefs regarding the commission of 
fraud, we significantly increase the risk of false reporting and, perhaps, 
overwhelm the system’s ability to identify truly grievous incidents of 
securities fraud. Moreover, the broader class of plaintiff-employees 
exacerbates corporations’ fears of illegitimate reprisal. Incompetent 
employees may also be potential whistleblowers, and this potential 
increases under Van Asdale’s more deferential standard. The problem is 
one of balancing corporate interests in efficiency against the risk 
associated with a whistleblower suit: “Retaining incompetent employees 
can lead to inefficiencies that affect productivity and profitability. 
Nonetheless, when employers fail to adhere to the SOX whistleblower 
provisions, they become subject to civil and criminal liability 
exposure.”142 
 
and/or back pay. It is also likely that terminated employees will attempt to extract a measure of 
revenge on former supervisors, particularly those responsible for the employees’ termination.”); see 
also Ralph F. Hall & Robert J. Berlin, When You Have a Hammer Everything Looks Like a Nail: 
Misapplication of the False Claims Act to Off-Label Promotion, 61 Food & Drug L.J. 653, 675 (2006) 
(arguing that bounty provisions can upset carefully balanced congressional policy decisions). 
 141. Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 142. Steinberg & Kaufman, supra note 47, at 457. 
Wiener_62-HLJ-531.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:21 PM 
552 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:531 
From a cost-benefit standpoint, two conclusions seem appropriate. 
First, when dealing with incentives, an expansion of remedies available 
under SOX to include prospective bounties would increase the costs 
associated with false or bad faith whistleblowing.143 It seems clear, then, 
that the more appropriate method of reforming incentives would be to 
provide more comprehensive retrospective remedies to ameliorate the 
problems previously identified. This lowers costs to all parties: 
Employees are better guaranteed compensation for blowing the whistle, 
employers are shielded from frivolous lawsuits, and the government and 
regulatory agencies have fewer complaints to deal with and can thus 
focus limited resources on the most promising matters. 
Second, and for similar reasons, the procedural requirements of 
SOX should not be lowered as the Ninth Circuit has done. In a 
comprehensive empirical study of SOX whistleblower claims at the 
administrative level, both at the level of OSHA review and as 
determined by an administrative law judge (ALJ), Professor Richard E. 
Moberly found that only 5.6% of whistleblower cases on OSHA review 
and 14.5% of whistleblower cases decided by an ALJ were dismissed for 
lack of reasonable belief.144 The far greater cause of an employee’s loss 
was a finding that the activity was not a contributing factor in the adverse 
employment action (35.5% and 21.7% respectively).145 A finding that the 
employer was not covered by SOX resulted in 15.4% and 28.9% of 
dismissals on OSHA review and by ALJs respectively.146 With respect to 
the reasonable belief standard, Professor Moberly concluded that 
“Congress should amend the Act to emphasize that an employee’s 
reasonable belief regarding the illegality of an activity reported should be 
compared with an employee of similar education and experience.”147 
Lowering the standard by which reasonable belief is judged would, it 
seems, result in a relatively limited benefit to employees seeking review. 
 
 143. Corporations face numerous costs when dealing with whistleblower statutes:  
Employees may lodge false complaints or engage in bad faith disclosures and thereby 
prevent the supervisor from taking legitimate adverse actions against them; alternatively, 
employees may not understand that conduct that appears to the employee to be 
inappropriate is in fact legal. . . .  
Ramirez, supra note 56, at 223. Moreover, these  costs are hard to measure or even to anticipate: 
The costs [associated with whistleblower laws] are difficult to quantify because adopting an 
effective program in response to anti-retaliation legislation may include the cost of time for 
training, establishing hotlines, potential arbitration, or even litigation. But without the 
legislation, businesses bear costs of mismanagement, potential litigation, and costs of crime, 
whether it is fraud, theft, or human life. 
Id. at 225–26. 
 144. Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley 
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 65, 102 (2007). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 141. 
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Thus employers would incur extra costs associated with whistleblower 
compliance, while the public received relatively little marginal increase in 
successful whistleblower complaints. In Part IV, this Note will propose 
an alternative approach that attempts to balance these competing 
interests in a socially beneficial manner. 
IV.  Resolving the Conflict, Updating the Law: A Proposal 
There are essentially two conclusions to be drawn from the current 
state of whistleblower protections under SOX. First, the incentives to 
blow the whistle and the scope of the law’s coverage are of paramount 
importance. Retrospective remedies, rather than bounties, are more 
appropriate for whistleblower laws. Second, Van Asdale should be 
overturned in favor of the standard reached by the other circuits.148 
Expanding the scope of covered employers, rather than the scope of 
potential employee-plaintiffs, is a more ideologically consistent method 
of increasing whistleblowing. Unfortunately, Congress chose to 
implement essentially the opposite of both these recommendations. The 
Dodd-Frank Act creates several new, but separate, whistleblower 
protections. It also incentivizes some whistleblowing by expanding the 
use of qui tam provisions. The Dodd-Frank Act, then, is a useful 
analytical tool in demonstrating how these changes could have been, but 
ultimately were not implemented by Congress. 
A. Recommendations for Incentives and Scope 
First, consistent with the costs and benefits identified in Part III, this 
Note recommends that Congress amend SOX to reflect two changes in 
the whistleblower protections. Congress should more explicitly protect 
against the harms faced by an employee reporting fraud within her 
company. This Note strongly endorses a grant of non-pecuniary damages 
to whistleblowers under SOX:  
  Sarbanes-Oxley should ensure, at the very least, that whistleblowers 
can potentially recoup all losses they will suffer for reporting 
wrongdoing. If we do not grant whistleblowers sufficient damages to 
make them whole, then whistleblowers face a perverse disincentive to 
act, and whistleblowers on the margin may decide not to help society.149 
An employee’s choice to blow the whistle represents a belief that 
the dictates of morality, legality, economics, or ethics require the 
employee to report the illegal actions. Two distinct economic 
considerations may also factor into the decision: Can the employee profit 
from reporting,150 and will the employee incur severe financial hardship? 
 
 148. See supra Part II.B. 
 149. Schichor, supra note 134, at 295 (footnotes omitted). 
 150. See F. Paul Bland, Why “Qui Tam” Is Necessary, Nat’l L.J., Nov. 4, 1991, at 13, 14 (“Critics 
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For some whistleblowers, the importance of acting ethically will result in 
reporting regardless of the consequences or the available remedies; 
however, “those who are on the margins, those employees who are trying 
to decide if reporting illegal activity is worth losing their jobs, may be 
influenced.”151 Other employees may only act if given the chance to earn 
a lucrative bounty, and “are motivated primarily by prospects of 
monetary reward rather than the public good.”152 Ultimately, this Note 
argues that full compensation of whistleblowers for economic and non-
economic damages, and not qui tam bounties, represents the soundest 
method of encouraging whistleblowing for the public good. 
The alternative to the more technical approach advocated by this 
Note would be a broad expansion of federal whistleblowing laws that 
override the narrow, issue-specific schemes currently in place. Professor 
Miriam Cherry persuasively argues that whistleblowers should receive 
protection for reporting any violation of federal law, subject to certain 
restrictions.153 She notes that employees who may wish to report 
violations of myriad federal and state laws could be discouraged by the 
lack of protections, and that those who do report such violations may 
“fall through the cracks.”154 This approach is harmonious with the 
problems and solutions identified in this Note, as it would provide more 
uniform and predictable protections and increase enforcement of federal 
law (including securities law).155 
While such a dramatic expansion of federal whistleblower 
protections would not be without its problems, a broad and cohesive 
whistleblowing scheme is also not without precedent. The WPA protects 
civil servants from retaliation for reporting violations of any federal 
law.156 Likewise, the FCA incentivizes whistleblowing regarding any 
fraud against the government.157 Implicit within both of these statutes is a 
belief that the reporting of any wrongdoing should be incentivized. It is 
hard to believe that a scheme incorporating the enormous federal civil 
service would somehow break down if expanded to the private sector. 
 
fear that the law appeals to the worst instincts of the individual—disloyalty, greed and self-
advancement.”). 
 151. See Cherry, supra note 32, at 1086. 
 152. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997) (discussing qui 
tam bounties in the context of the False Claims Act); see also supra Part III.A.2. 
 153. See Cherry, supra note 32, at 1085. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (“Such protection would have a positive impact not only on the individual whistleblowers 
who receive direct protection under the law, but also on the enforcement of federal statutes. A 
uniform statement of state law, standardizing the types of dismissal that are against public policy, 
would also be a positive development.”). 
 156. See supra Part I.B. 
 157. Id. 
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Comparative analysis bears this out. In the United Kingdom, a broad 
range of employees are protected: 
  The U.K. law . . . defines a “qualifying disclosure” as one that a 
worker reasonably believes tends to show activities falling into one or 
more of the following categories: 1) a criminal offense; 2) failure to 
comply with any legal obligation; 3) a miscarriage of justice; 4) danger 
to the health and safety of any individual; 5) damage to the 
environment; or 6) the deliberate concealment of information tending 
to show any of these circumstances.158  
Limiting this broad grant of protection is a requirement that the 
employee have acted in good faith, as the law “explicitly withholds 
protection from whistleblowers who act for personal gain.”159 These 
schemes all point to the reasonableness of a broad, non-subject-matter-
based protection for whistleblowers, which relies on moral and ethical 
obligations instead of bounties, covers many—if not all—violations of 
federal law, and provides for sufficient compensation to the employee. 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Van Asdale should be 
overturned in favor of the predominant rule requiring belief that fraud 
actually occurred. The aforementioned costs and risks to employers by 
dissatisfied and terminated employees seeking whistleblower protections 
would be greatly amplified if the courts allow whistleblower claims 
whenever an employee feels something should be investigated. There is 
also the risk of either compartmentalization within corporations (to 
prevent “red flags” and thus, claims under the investigation standard) or 
the retention of employees who would otherwise have been fired but for 
the threat of a whistleblower suit. This Note proposes that the more 
appropriate mechanism for expanding whistleblower protections is 
legislative: an expansion of covered employers and/or subject matter. 
Judicial manipulation of reasonableness standards simply disrupts the 
balanced whistleblower scheme enacted by Congress too much. This 
disruption, compared to a legislatively-crafted solution, would affect a 
greater percentage of whistleblower cases, as only a small percentage of 
potential SOX claims are dismissed for lack of reasonable belief.160 
Maintaining the standard as-is ensures that the procedural safeguards 
that prevent false reporting, including the objective-subjective standard, 
remain in place. 
 
 158. Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches to 
Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 879, 885 (2004). 
 159. Id. at 895. 
 160. See Moberly, supra note 144, at 102. 
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B. The Dodd-Frank Act 
The Dodd-Frank Act, passed in July 2010, contained several 
provisions related to whistleblowing.161 Conceptually, these changes can 
be classified into two groups: (1) the creation of new whistleblower 
schemes,162 and (2) the expansion or retooling of existing schemes.163 Each 
of these represents a fundamental failure to resolve the structural 
weaknesses in federal whistleblower laws, and each perpetuates and 
expands upon the underlying causes of that weakness. 
The new statutory schemes follow the same subject-specific 
protection discussed above. For example, § 1057 prohibits employers 
from retaliating against an employee who “reasonably believes” that a 
violation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s consumer protection provisions has 
occurred, if that employee is in the financial services sector.164 Section 748 
provides similar protections for violations of the Commodities Exchange 
Act.165 Section 922 creates a broad whistleblowing scheme for reporting 
any original information regarding securities fraud to the SEC.166 
Each of these new protections represents a distinct area of 
protection, and none simplifies the mosaic of statutory protections. 
Indeed, these additions serve only to compound the problems associated 
with having multiple and varying protection schemes scattered 
throughout the United States Code. Furthermore, all of these new 
whistleblower protections provide either too little compensation to the 
employee (§ 1057 employees are entitled to only economic damages, 
such as back pay and litigation costs)167 or too much compensation (§ 922 
provides for qui tam awards of between ten and thirty percent, and the 
provision only applies to claims of over one million dollars in value).168 
The Dodd-Frank Act’s changes to the existing whistleblower 
schemes provide no additional clarity. Sections 922 and 929A amend the 
SOX whistleblower provisions to correct procedural issues that had 
arisen, such as the liability of subsidiary companies169 and the statute of 
limitations.170 Neither change provides guidance for the split discussed in 
this Note, nor increases the compensation of reporting employees to 
provide adequately for non-pecuniary damages. Congress merely 
perpetuated the piecemeal system, which, this Note argues, poorly 
 
 161. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 162. See, e.g., id. §§ 748, 922, 1057. 
 163. See, e.g., id. §§ 922, 929A, 1079(b). 
 164. Id. § 1057(a)(1). 
 165. Id. § 748. 
 166. Id. § 922. 
 167. Id. § 1057(c)(4)(D). 
 168. Id. § 922(b)(1). 
 169. Id. § 929A. 
 170. Id. § 922(c). 
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incentivizes and protects whistleblowers. Congress also failed to provide 
any additional guidance regarding the reasonable belief standard. 
Unfortunately, as the weight of these disparate protections increases, we 
are likely to see increased confusion among employees about what is 
covered, who is protected, and how they should report potential 
violations. 
Conclusion 
Protecting whistleblowers reflects a careful balancing act. On the 
one hand, there is the desire to protect employees, to encourage 
disclosure, and to discourage corporations from engaging in fraud. On 
the other hand, compliance costs time and money. If we increase 
incentives too much, we risk self-interested employees filing false reports 
in pursuit of bounties, or disgruntled ex-employees seeking revenge on 
their old employers. The Ninth Circuit admirably sought to expand 
whistleblower protections by lowering the standard for what constitutes 
reasonable belief, thereby essentially allowing protections for allegations 
of inchoate fraud. As this Note has shown, this is an undesirable 
approach. Increasing retrospective incentives to make employees whole 
and thus, reduce the burdens of whistleblowing would more effectively 
balance the encouragement of whistleblowing with the costs of false 
claims made in bad faith. Alternatively, an increase in the scope of 
whistleblower protections at the federal level could accomplish many of 
these same goals, while covering a broader range of federal law. In either 
case, Van Asdale should be overturned, as it is simply too unmanageable 
and disruptive. With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, congressional 
motivation to fix the federal whistleblower system is likely weakening. 
Unfortunately, the piecemeal expansion of whistleblower protections 
only begets more piecemeal expansions, and a substantial overhaul of the 
underlying legislative rational becomes less likely. Nevertheless, 
movement towards a comprehensive, unified, and properly incentivized 
system would be invaluable in preventing future financial crises, and 
future legislation could yet solve this statutory quagmire. 
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